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Luminosity Guaranteed 
Wolfgang Barz 
 
Abstract. This paper aims to show that Williamson’s (2000) anti-luminosity argument does not succeed if 
we presuppose a constitutive connection between the phenomenal and the doxastic. In contrast to other 
luminists, however, my strategy is not to critically focus on the refined safety condition in terms of 
degrees of confidence that anti-luminists typically use in this context. Instead, I will argue that, given a 
certain conception of what Chalmers (2003) calls “direct phenomenal concepts,” luminosity is guaranteed 
even if the refined safety condition in terms of degrees of confidence is taken for granted. 
 
 
1  Introduction 
 
Williamson’s (1996; 2000) anti-luminosity argument is often criticized for neglecting 
the possibility that there might be a constitutive connection between phenomenal 
experiences and certain beliefs about them. If there is such a connection, luminists 
claim, then Williamson’s argument is not sound. In response, anti-luminists typically 
resort to a refined safety condition in terms of degrees of confidence, in light of which 
phenomenal experiences such as feeling cold do not seem to be luminous, even under 
the assumption that there is a constitutive connection between the phenomenal and the 
doxastic. Luminists, in turn, react by criticizing the refined safety condition, arguing 
that it is too strong a requirement for knowledge.
1 The aim of this paper is to side with the luminists. However, I will not join in the 
attack on the refined safety condition. Instead, I will argue that, even if the refined 
safety condition is taken for granted, it does not follow that phenomenal experiences 
such as feeling cold are not luminous. The key idea is that phenomenal beliefs involving 
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what Chalmers (2003) calls direct phenomenal concepts are immune against epistemic 
luck. 
 
 
2  Williamson’s argument reshaped 
 
First, let us recall what is at issue: Williamson’s (1996; 2000) anti-luminosity argument. 
Williamson’s argument is designed to show that the conditions many think of as 
paradigmatically luminous, such as being in a certain phenomenal state, are not 
luminous. Using Williamson’s favorite example, it is possible that one fails to know 
that one currently feels cold, even if (i) one currently does feel cold, (ii) one attends to 
one’s current feeling of cold as assiduously as possible, and (iii) one believes that one 
currently feels cold on the basis of one’s introspective evidence. 
 
Williamson’s argument revolves around an example of gradual warming. In order to 
make the case more vivid, let us look at Brian Weatherson’s reformulation: 
 
Mr. Davis’s apartment faces southwest, so while it is often cold in the mornings it always warms up as 
the midday and afternoon sun streams in. This morning Mr. Davis felt cold when he awoke, but now at 
noon he is quite warm, almost hot. But the change from wake-up time to the present is rather gradual. Mr. 
Davis does not take a hot bath that morning, nor cook a hot breakfast, but sits reading by the window 
until the sun does its daily magic. (Weatherson 2004, 375) 
 
Assume furthermore that throughout the period of time described, Mr. Davis carefully 
attends to how cold he feels. Thus, at every point in time, Mr. Davis holds some belief 
as to whether or not he currently feels cold. Predictably, Mr. Davis’s confidence that he 
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feels cold gradually diminishes: when he woke up, he firmly believed that he felt cold, 
but now, at noon, he firmly believes that he no longer feels cold but hot. However, note 
that since the change from feeling cold to feeling hot is extremely gradual and Mr. 
Davis’s powers of discriminations—as with all of us human beings—are limited, he is 
not able to introspectively distinguish between his thermal experience at some point in 
time and his thermal experience one millisecond later. 
 
Usually, Williamson’s argument is reconstructed as a reductio ad absurdum that is 
driven by a so-called “margin for error” principle to the effect that if Mr. Davis knows 
that he feels cold at some point in time, then he feels cold one millisecond later. From 
the assumption that the state of feeling cold is luminous, along with the description of 
the case, it follows that Mr. Davis knows that he feels cold at t0, that is, immediately 
after he woke up. From the fact that Mr. Davis knows that he feels cold at t0, combined 
with the margin for error principle, it follows that Mr. Davis feels cold at t1, which is at 
an interval of only one millisecond from t0. Now the luminosity-assumption takes effect 
again and leads to the claim that Mr. Davis knows that he feels cold at t1. From this, 
combined with the margin for error principle, it follows that Mr. Davis feels cold at t2, 
which is at an interval of only one millisecond from t1, and so on and so forth till we 
arrive at the conclusion that Mr. Davis feels cold at tn, that is, at noon. Since this is 
absurd, Williamson argues that the luminosity-assumption must be abandoned. 
 
Although the above reconstruction might be very close to Williamson’s original 
considerations, it is somewhat unfortunate. Williamson’s margin for error principle, for 
example, essentially depends on the idea that safety is necessary for knowledge. Thus, 
the argument can be straightforwardly rebutted by denying that safety is necessary for 
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knowledge.2 Moreover, Williamson’s margin for error principle has the air of a soritical 
premise, so that the argument might be dismissed as belonging to the same class of 
paradoxes such as the Heap or the Bald Man.3 In my view, both criticisms are beside the 
point—for Williamson’s argument might easily be reformulated without using the 
aforementioned margin for error principle. For this, we should not perceive it as an 
argument to the conclusion that it is possible for someone who feels cold to introspect 
as assiduously as possible without thereby coming to know that one feels cold, but 
rather as an argument to the conclusion that it is possible for someone who feels cold to 
introspect as assiduously as possible without thereby coming to safely believe that one 
feels cold.4 
 
Certainly, the target of the argument, so construed, is considerably weaker than the 
target of the original version. While Williamson’s original argument aimed at refuting 
the claim that, if one is in a phenomenal state, one is in a position to know that one is in 
that state, the reshaped argument aims at refuting the claim that, if one is in a 
phenomenal state, one is in a position to safely believe that one is in that state. 
However, this weaker claim is nevertheless strong enough to be interesting in 
philosophical respects as it is an instance of the following scheme: 
 
For some mental states M, and some cognitive or epistemic relation Φ, necessarily, if one is in M, then 
one Φs that one is in M.5 
 
Historically influent instances of Φ, for example, are knowing or justifiably believing—
the idea thereby expressed is usually called self-intimation. The relation of being in a 
position to safely believe is at least as interesting in this context. According to the target 
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of the reshaped argument, our beliefs about our current phenomenal states are 
waterproofed against epistemic luck, at least if they are based on careful introspection. 
In contrast to perceptual beliefs about the external world, introspective beliefs about 
one’s current phenomenal states, so the idea goes, are especially secure in that, if they 
are true, they could not easily have been false. In my view, this is a veritable privileged 
access thesis, and, more importantly, an argument questioning that thesis is worth 
considering. 
 
Therefore, let us revisit the case of Mr. Davis. Let t0, t1, ..., tn be a series of times at one 
millisecond intervals from dawn to noon. Accordingly, call the situation in which Mr. 
Davis woke up “α0” and the situation at noon “αn.” It is plausible to assume that 
somewhere in between there is a phenomenal watershed, so to speak: there are two 
bordering cases, αi and αi+1, such that in αi, Mr. Davis feels cold and in αi+1, he no 
longer feels cold.6 Moreover, suppose for the sake of argument, that the content of Mr. 
Davis’s beliefs is perfectly aligned with his thermal state such that, in αi, Mr. Davis 
truly believes that he feels cold, whereas, in αi+1, he no longer believes that he feels 
cold. Now, the crucial question is this: Does Mr. Davis, in αi, safely believe that he feels 
cold? 
 
At first glance, the right answer seems to be “no.” The reason is provided by the 
following conditional that I assume will be acceptable to all safety theorists regardless 
of whether they adhere to a “zero tolerance” principle concerning false beliefs in any 
close worlds (like Williamson 2000 or Sosa 1999) or not (like Pritchard 2005): 
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A true belief b, actually held by a subject S, is unsafe if there is an extremely similar possible situation in 
which S continues to form b in the same way as in the actual situation, even though b is false. 
 
In the case at hand, there certainly is such a situation: though, in actuality, Mr. Davis, at 
ti+1, no longer believes that he feels cold, he might well have continued to believe that he 
felt cold at ti+1. Recall that, similar to all of us human beings, Mr. Davis is not able to 
distinguish between his thermal experience at some point in time and his thermal 
experience one millisecond later. Thus, Mr. Davis is not able to distinguish between his 
thermal experience at ti and his thermal experience at ti+1. Therefore, it is eminently 
possible that he might have mistaken his thermal experience at ti+1 for his thermal 
experience at ti, such that at ti+1, he incorrectly believed that he felt cold. Let us call this 
latter situation “βi+1.” Certainly, βi+1 is not actual. However, it seems fairly possible. 
Moreover, βi+1 is extremely similar to αi. From the perspective of Mr. Davis, for 
example, there is no difference between αi and βi+1: both situations feel the same for 
him. In βi+1, Mr. Davis forms a belief that he feels cold in exactly the same way as he 
does in αi, namely, based on his current introspective evidence. Thus, there seems to be 
no denying that in αi, Mr. Davis unsafely believes that he feels cold.7 
 
It appears then that we have before us quite a convincing argument against the claim 
that it is impossible that one fails to safely believe that one currently feels cold, given 
that (i) one currently feels cold, (ii) one attends to one’s current feeling of cold as 
assiduously as possible, and (iii) one believes that one currently feels cold on the basis 
of one’s introspective evidence. Note that this version of Williamson’s argument copes 
without any margin for error principle—it merely makes use of a relatively 
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uncontroversial conception of safety. Thus, it cannot be rebutted by denying that safety 
is necessary for knowledge. It cannot also be dismissed as a sorites.  
 
 
3  Safety regained through direct phenomenal concepts 
 
However, there is a way to salvage the claim that Mr. Davis, in αi, safely believes that 
he feels cold. Taking one’s cue from Weatherson (2004), Berker (2008), and 
Ramachandran (2009), one might say that, in general, there is a “constitutive” 
connection between our phenomenal states and our beliefs about them that underwrites 
the claim that if Mr. Davis has done everything he can to decide whether he feels cold, 
then he believes that he feels cold only if he feels cold.8 If the latter claim is true, there 
cannot be a situation such as βi+1, that is, a situation in which Mr. Davis believes that he 
feels cold, though he actually does not feel cold. 
 
There are several ways of unpacking what the constitutive connection between our 
phenomenal states and our beliefs about them might amount to. Weatherson, for 
example, claims that, when Mr. Davis “is in some phenomenal state, the very same 
brain states constitute both the phenomena and a belief about the phenomena” (2004, 
379). In my view, Weatherson’s claim is unfortunate in dialectical respects—for it 
presupposes materialism concerning the mind. Since materialism is a controversial 
doctrine, I think that the constitutivist fares better if he or she adopts a strategy that is 
based on the idea of direct phenomenal concepts in Chalmers’ (2003) sense.9 The 
constitutivist might then say that when Mr. Davis forms a belief as to whether he feels 
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cold, he uses a direct phenomenal concept of his present thermal condition, that is, a 
concept that somehow incorporates the thermal experience he currently undergoes. 
 
To better understand how this strategy works, it may be instructive to regard direct 
phenomenal concepts as analogous to expressions that are formed with the help of 
quotation marks.10 For example, Katalin Balog (2012) claims that there is a concept-
forming mechanism, called “mental quotation,” that operates on an experience and turns 
it into a direct phenomenal concept that refers to the type of phenomenal experience that 
the token exemplifies. Balog even uses a characteristic symbol for mental quotes, 
namely “*,” to emphasize the analogy between linguistic and mental quotation. The 
only difference, she says, between linguistic and mental quotation “is that, unlike 
linguistic quotation, what is between mental quotes [...] is not a mental word but [...] an 
experience.”11 Thus, in light of Balog’s account, there is a clear sense in which a 
conscious experience is inside a concept: just as the quoting expression “ ‘tree’ ” literally 
contains the word “tree,” a direct phenomenal concept, say, of the feeling of cold 
literally contains that feeling.12 
 
Let us now apply these ideas to the case of Mr. Davis. At each point in time, Mr. Davis 
holds some belief about his current thermal experience on the basis of his introspective 
findings. Recall that, in αi, Mr. Davis feels cold, whereas, in αi+1, Mr. Davis no longer 
feels cold, but presumably, is in an “in-between” state such that he neither feels cold nor 
feels hot. Let us represent the “cold” thermal experience that Mr. Davis undergoes in αi 
as “↓” and the “in-between” thermal experience that Mr. Davis undergoes in αi+1 as 
“→.” In αi, then, Mr. Davis holds a belief that might be rendered as “I currently 
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undergo *↓*,” where “*↓*” stands for a direct phenomenal concept that incorporates 
the very thermal experience that Mr. Davis undergoes in αi. In αi+1, however, Mr. Davis 
holds a belief that might be rendered as “I currently undergo *→*,” where “*→*” 
stands for a direct phenomenal concept that incorporates the very thermal experience 
that Mr. Davis undergoes in αi+1. Therefore, in both αi and αi+1, Mr. Davis holds a true 
belief about his current thermal experience. Moreover, at any point in time, Mr. Davis’s 
belief is safe. This is because, for any actual situation αx, there is no extremely similar 
possible situation in which: (1) Mr. Davis continues to form the respective belief in the 
same way as in the actual situation; and (2) the belief in question is false. 
 
One might rub one’s eyes in disbelief at this point: “Didn’t you say that Mr. Davis is not 
able to distinguish between his thermal experience at some point in time and his thermal 
experience one millisecond later? So it must be possible that he mistakes the thermal 
experience that he undergoes in αi+1 for the thermal experience he undergoes in αi!” 
However, the opponent here has not reckoned with direct phenomenal concepts. 
Consider what the idea of mistaking the thermal experience in αi+1 for the thermal 
experience in αi could mean in terms of beliefs that involve direct phenomenal 
concepts. One might suggest that this idea amounts to a situation in which, at ti+1, Mr. 
Davis forms a belief that might be rendered as: “I currently undergo *↓*.” However, 
recall that at ti+1, Mr. Davis no longer feels cold: he no longer undergoes ↓, and instead 
undergoes →. Thus, at ti+1, it is not possible for Mr. Davis to form a direct phenomenal 
concept that incorporates ↓. Consequently, it is impossible that at ti+1, Mr. Davis holds a 
belief that might be rendered as: “I currently undergo *↓*.” 
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One might condense these findings into the following conclusion: Necessarily, if S 
holds the belief “I currently undergo σ” at time t (where “σ” stands for some direct 
phenomenal concept that refers to some experience, namely, that very experience which 
is part of “σ”), then at t, S undergoes the very experience to which “σ” refers. This not 
only implies that one cannot hold a belief of the “I currently undergo σ” type if one 
does not undergo the experience that is part of the direct phenomenal concept one 
thereby uses, but also that beliefs of the “I currently undergo σ” type are infallible, that 
is, that there is just no possible situation in which someone holds a false belief of the “I 
currently undergo σ” type. From this, it follows quite trivially that there is no possible 
situation extremely similar to αi (in which, recall, Mr. Davis holds the belief “I 
currently undergo *↓*”) such that: (1) Mr. Davis continues to form the belief “I 
currently undergo *↓*” in the same way as he does in αi, and (2) the belief “I currently 
undergo *↓*” is false. Therefore, Mr. Davis’s belief about his own current thermal 
experience in αi is undoubtedly safe.13 
 
 
4  Confidence safety 
 
However, there seems to be a way to avoid this conclusion: by slightly modifying the 
conception of safety. Instead of saying that false belief is sufficient for lack of safety, 
one might claim that high confidence in a falsehood is sufficient for lack of safety: 
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A true belief that p, actually held by subject S with degree of confidence c, is unsafe if there is an 
extremely similar possible situation in which S continues to have an at-most-slightly-lower degree of 
confidence c* in the proposition that p, though p is false.14 
 
In order to see the point of this modification, note that one can have a high degree of 
confidence in a proposition without believing it to be true. Let us assume, then, that the 
confidence threshold of outright belief is 0.8: if the degree of confidence in a 
proposition p is 0.8 or greater, then we have an outright belief in p. If, in contrast, the 
degree of confidence in p is less than 0.8, then belief in p has vanished. 
 
Let us revisit, then, the example of Mr. Davis. It is obvious that in αi, Mr. Davis has a 
degree of confidence in the proposition that is expressed by “I currently undergo *↓*” 
that is sufficient for outright belief. However, since Mr. Davis’s belief in this 
proposition vanishes within the next millisecond, it is natural to assume that the 
respective degree of confidence is only barely above the threshold for outright belief. 
Let us say that it is exactly 0.8. The crucial question is: how do matters stand in αi+1? 
Since, in αi+1, Mr. Davis no longer holds the belief “I currently undergo *↓*,” (instead, 
recall, he holds the belief “I currently undergo *→*”) his degree of confidence in the 
proposition expressed by “I currently undergo *↓*” must be less than 0.8. However, 
since Mr. Davis held the belief “I currently undergo *↓*” only a millisecond before, 
and, in addition, is not able to tell → from ↓, it seems reasonable to suspect that his 
degree of confidence in the proposition expressed by “I currently undergo *↓*” is only 
very slightly lower than 0.8—say, 0,7999. Thus,  it turns out that, in αi, Mr. Davis holds 
a belief that is not safe; for there is an extremely similar possible situation, namely αi+1, 
in which he continues to have an at-most-slightly-lower degree of confidence in the 
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proposition expressed by “I currently undergo *↓*,” although this proposition is false. It 
seems, then, that “even a constitutive connection between feeling cold and believing 
one feels cold is insufficient to vindicate luminosity” (Srinivasan 2015, 310). 
 
The standard luminist response to this challenge is to doubt the modified conception of 
safety in terms of degrees of confidence. For example, Berker (2008) has claimed that 
the modified safety condition “deems as unreliable belief-forming mechanisms that 
appear to be as reliable as they could possibly be” (12). Regardless of the merits of this 
strategy, I think that the luminist can provide a more straightforward response. To 
understand this, let us take a closer look at the proposition central to our consideration: 
the proposition about his thermal experience that Mr. Davis believes in αi. In the 
preceding paragraph, I have referred to this proposition as “the proposition that is 
expressed by ‘I currently undergo *↓*’.” However, this is not quite accurate, because 
different tokens of “I currently undergo *↓*” can express different propositions. Thus, it 
would be more appropriate to specify the proposition in question as “the proposition 
that is expressed by the sentence ‘I currently undergo *↓*’ as it is entertained in 
thought by Mr. Davis at ti.” Let us call this proposition “pi.” One might say that pi 
consists of Mr. Davis, time ti, the thermal experience that Mr. Davis undergoes at ti, and 
the relation of undergoing. Note that pi does not change its truth-value across time. In 
particular, pi is true in αi+1. Thus, αi+1 does not qualify as a situation extremely similar 
to αi (in which, recall, Mr. Davis has a degree of confidence in pi that is sufficient for 
belief) such that: (1) Mr. Davis continues to have an at-most-slightly-lower degree of 
confidence in pi; and (2) pi is false. 
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Certainly, the proposition that is expressed by the sentence “I currently undergo *↓*” as 
it might be entertained in thought by Mr. Davis at ti+1—call it “pi+1”—is false. 
However, mind you, this is not the proposition that Mr. Davis believes to be true at ti. 
While the latter proposition, that is, pi, consists, inter alia, of time ti, the former 
proposition, that is, pi+1, consists, inter alia, of time ti+1. Thus, even on the modified 
version of safety in terms of degrees of confidence, Mr. Davis’s belief about his thermal 
experience in αi proves to be safe: there is no possible situation that is extremely similar 
to αi in which the proposition Mr. Davis believes true in αi is false and he nevertheless 
continues to have an at-most-slightly-lower degree of confidence in it.15 
 
It must be noted here that the difference between pi and pi+1 is extremely slight. Thus, in 
order to defend the claim that Mr. Davis’s belief about his thermal experience in αi is 
not safe, one might suggest a slightly modified version of the already modified 
conception of safety: 
 
A true belief that p, actually held by subject S with degree of confidence c, is unsafe if there is an 
extremely similar possible situation in which S has an at-most-slightly-lower degree of confidence c* in 
an at-most-slightly-different proposition p*, though p* is false.16 
 
However, even if we grant this once-more-modified conception of safety, it does not 
follow that Mr. Davis’s belief about his thermal experience in αi is unsafe. Recall that 
the thermal experience symbolized by “↓” has ceased to exist at ti+1. Because of this, it 
is no longer possible for Mr. Davis to form the direct phenomenal concept “*↓*” at ti+1. 
Accordingly, Mr. Davis is not capable of entertaining the sentence “I currently undergo 
*↓*” in thought at ti+1. It follows that it is impossible for Mr. Davis to grasp the 
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proposition pi+1 at ti+1. Therefore, Mr. Davis cannot have any degree of confidence in 
pi+1 either. The proposition pi+1, as it were, is just not on Mr. Davis’s mental radar in 
αi+1. Summarizing, αi+1 does not count as a situation extremely similar to αi in which 
Mr. Davis continues to have an at-most-slightly-lower degree of confidence in the 
merely slightly different, but nonetheless false, proposition pi+1. 
 
One might object that it may be right that Mr. Davis cannot have any degree of 
confidence in pi+1; however, this does not imply that there is no proposition whatsoever 
that might work instead. Consider, for example, the proposition that is expressed by the 
sentence “I currently undergo that” as might be entertained in thought by Mr. Davis at 
ti+1—where the demonstrative refers to the “cold” thermal experience Mr. Davis 
underwent only millisecond ago, at ti.17 This proposition, call it “pthat,” is clearly false at 
ti+1. Nevertheless, it is plausible to assume that Mr. Davis has a degree of confidence in 
pthat at ti+1 that is at most slightly lower than the degree of confidence he has in pi at ti. 
Therefore, it seems that we have a situation that is extremely similar to αi in which Mr. 
Davis continues to have an at-most-slightly-lower degree of confidence in a false 
proposition that is merely slightly different from pi.18 
 
In my opinion, this objection is based on an excessively liberal view about what should 
count as a slight difference between propositions. Note that in contrast to the difference 
between pi+1 and pi, the difference between pthat and pi not only concerns the time 
parameter, but also extends to the mode of presentation under which the “cold” thermal 
experience in question is given to Mr. Davis. I admit that it is difficult to explain the 
difference between the mode of presentation expressed by a direct phenomenal concept 
such as “*↓*” and the mode of presentation expressed by a demonstrative concept such 
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as “that.” However, I think that it is possible to acquire at least an approximate idea by 
comparing the semantic behavior of these concepts across possible worlds. 
 
Let us begin with the demonstrative concept “that” (as used by Mr. Davis at ti+1 to refer 
to the thermal experience he underwent only a millisecond before). Similar to all 
demonstrative concepts, “that” is a rigid designator, i.e. it rigidly refers to the item, 
whatever it is, that is the target of the corresponding demonstration. In addition to being 
rigid, “that” also exhibits some amount of situation-sensitivity: its reference might shift 
depending on the situation in which the speaker or thinker finds himself/herself. In a 
case where the situation in which Mr. Davis uses “that” is significantly different from 
the actual situation, “that” would rigidly refer to another experience. Consider, for 
example, a situation in which a slight tickle in his right big toe is the target of Mr. 
Davis’s demonstration. If this situation were actual, “that” would rigidly refer to the 
slight tickle in Mr. Davis’s right big toe. 
 
Similar things can be said about standing phenomenal concepts that pick out the “cold” 
thermal experience Mr. Davis undergoes at ti. Consider, for example, “feeling of cold.” 
Plausibly, this concept might be paraphrased roughly as “the feeling that is typically 
caused in me in environments where temperature is low.” Now, consider a situation in 
which human thermal experiences are systematically inverted, that is, the feelings we 
call “feelings of cold” become typically caused in environments where temperature is 
high, whereas the feelings we call “feelings of warmness” become typically caused in 
environments where temperature is low. If this were the actual situation, “feeling of 
cold” would rigidly refer to what we call “feelings of warmness.” 
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Now, as Chalmers plausibly argues, things are different with direct phenomenal 
concepts.19 They, too, are rigid designators: they rigidly refer to the experience they are 
composed of. However, direct phenomenal concepts are not situation-sensitive at all. 
The reference of “*↓*,” for example, does not shift depending on the situation in which 
Mr. Davis finds himself. Consider again the situation in which a slight tickle in his right 
big toe is the target of Mr. Davis’s demonstration or the situation in which Mr. Davis 
has “inverted” thermal experiences. Even if these situations were actual, the reference 
of “*↓*” would not change. In general, there is no possible situation in which the 
reference of “*↓*” would change. In any case, “*↓*” would continue to rigidly refer to 
the thermal experience of which it is composed. Chalmers sums things up by saying that 
direct phenomenal concepts are super rigid: they are not only rigid concerning their 
secondary or subjunctive intension, but are also rigid concerning their primary or 
epistemic intension.20 
 
Now, given this difference in the modes of presentations associated with “that” and 
“*↓*,” the propositions pi and pthat are not sufficiently similar. Certainly, they may be 
said to be similar in that they attribute the same property (to be currently experienced by 
Mr. Davis) to the same item (a particular feeling of cold). However, they are strikingly 
dissimilar in that they present this item through different modes of presentations. Thus, 
pthat bears a relation to pi that is similar to the relation that the proposition expressed by 
the sentence “The morning star is shining” bears to the proposition expressed by the 
sentence “The evening star is shining.” The bottom line is that pthat (as well as any 
proposition obtained by replacing “*↓*” by a standing phenomenal concept) is not 
slightly but considerably different from pi.21 
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5  A Pyrrhic victory? 
 
In this section, I wish to address an objection that might and will no doubt be raised.22 
Recall the more general philosophical motivation behind Williamson’s anti-luminosity 
argument: its purpose is to discredit the view that there are some states of affairs—or 
“conditions,” as Williamson prefers to put it—such that the mere obtaining of them is 
sufficient for being in a position to know (or at least safely believe) that they obtain.23 
According to the view in question, these conditions form a so-called “cognitive home,” 
that is, a point from which thought starts to develop its conception of the rest of the 
world.24 Now, the objection is that my argument may have saved a cognitive home, but 
only at the cost of making it so small that it cannot be used as the thought’s starting 
point.25  
 
In order to make this objection more vivid, compare the beliefs “I currently undergo 
*↓*” and “I currently undergo a feeling of cold” as they might be held by Mr. Davis in 
αi. Both beliefs are true, but only the first one is both safe and infallible. However, it 
seems that this is only an empty compliment—for, in contrast to the second belief, the 
first belief cannot be used as a starting point for any inference that goes beyond such 
trivialities as “I currently undergo an experience of some kind or other,” or so it seems. 
The reason is that using an item as a representation of the type to which it belongs does 
not necessarily provide one with any clue concerning which type it is to which the item 
belongs. In this respect, the case of “I currently undergo *↓*” seems to be similar to the 
case in which someone lays his hand on top of his head and says “I am this tall.”26 As 
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one cannot infer from “I am this tall” how tall one actually is, one cannot infer from “I 
currently undergo *↓*” the type of experience that one undergoes. Moreover, it seems 
that “I currently undergo *↓*” cannot even rationally support (or confer justification to) 
any substantial belief about the phenomenal type of one’s current experience. It appears, 
then, that beliefs such as “I currently undergo *↓*” may be safe and infallible whenever 
they are held, but only at the cost of being devoid of any epistemic value. 
 
I must confess that, at times, I found this objection quite compelling. Nevertheless, I 
think that, in the end, it does not go through. The reason is that there is a crucial 
disanalogy between demonstratives and direct phenomenal concepts: while 
demonstratives can be successfully used to refer to something in the absence of any idea 
about what this something is like, any successful use of direct phenomenal concepts 
presupposes at least some idea about what the item to which it refers to is like. Consider 
a blindfolded subject who lacks any information about the environment she is in, but 
nevertheless randomly points with her index finger in some direction and says “This is a 
tree.” Although the subject does not know to which object she points and thus lacks any 
idea about what this object is like, she successfully refers to the object, whatever it is, 
which lies at the end of the imaginary line that emanates from the tip of her index 
finger. In the case of direct phenomenal concepts, things are different. The reason is that 
one cannot even form a direct phenomenal concept unless one has the respective 
experience. Having an experience, in turn, means that there is something it is like for the 
subject to have this experience. Now, there being something it is like for the subject to 
have an experience implies that the subject has at least some idea of what it is like to 
have the experience in question—even if this idea is ineffable. Thus, one cannot form 
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the belief “I currently undergo *↓*” unless one has at least some idea of what it is like 
to have a feeling of cold. If this is correct, then it is simply not true that believing “I 
currently undergo *↓*” does not provide one with any clue concerning the phenomenal 
type of one’s experience. Therefore, beliefs such as “I currently undergo *↓*” are not 
worthless in epistemic respects.27 
 
I hope that the previous considerations also mitigate a related concern that might be 
raised. Recall that Williamson does not claim that there are no luminous conditions. He 
only claims that there are no non-trivial conditions.28  As an example of a belief about a 
trivial condition in Williamson’s sense, consider the case of Rudolf Lingens, an 
amnesiac lost in the Main Library at Stanford on July 4, 1970 afternoon. Even though 
Lingens does not know who he is, where he is, and what time it is, it is very easy for 
him to know what he would express by uttering the sentence “I am here now.” The 
condition thereby expressed lies right before his eyes, so to speak. Lingens just cannot 
be ignorant or wrong about that. Thus, Williamson would concede that the condition 
Lingens believes to be true is luminous. However, Williamson would also insist that 
this condition is trivial, because the truth of what Lingens believes is compatible with a 
vast variety of possible situations—not just with the situation in which he actually is, 
that is, being in the Main Library at Stanford on July 4, 1970 afternoon, but also with 
being in King Street, Boston, on the morning of March 5, 1770 or being on Mars on 
December 12, 3040 at noon.29 The objection, then, is that Mr. Davis’s belief “I 
currently undergo *↓*” is in the same boat as Lingens’ belief—for it may seem as if the 
truth of what Mr. Davis’s believes is compatible with a vast variety of possible 
situations as well.30 
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However, it is easy to see why this objection does not succeed. The reason is simply 
that the variety of situations compatible with the truth of Mr. Davis’s belief “I currently 
undergo *↓*” is actually very, very small: It contains only situations in which the 
subject has a feeling of cold.31 This is a consequence of the fact that “*↓*” is 
epistemically rigid. The epistemic rigidity of “*↓*,” in turn, is a consequence of the fact 
that Mr. Davis—by undergoing the experience from which “*↓*” is built—directly 
grasps what it is like to feel cold. Now, a belief that is compatible with only a very 
small variety of alternative situations can hardly count as a belief about a trivial 
condition. Thus, the charge of triviality is unfounded. 
 
 
6  Summary 
 
This paper aimed to disprove Williamson’s anti-luminosity argument, even if one grants 
the anti-luminist a refined conception of safety in terms of degrees of confidence. In 
order to make Williamson’s argument as strong as possible, I first reshaped it in a way 
that avoids reference to the notorious margin for error principle—for reference to this 
principle considerably reduces the prima facie plausibility of the argument. Then, I 
outlined the discussion to the point where the constitutivist enters the stage. I argued 
that the constitutivist is well-advised to adopt the idea of direct phenomenal concepts, 
that is, phenomenal concepts that literally contain the experiences to which they refer. 
The natural response of the anti-luminist was to retreat to a conception of safety to the 
effect that high confidence in a falsehood is already sufficient for lack of safety. 
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However, it emerged that constitutivism backed by the idea of direct phenomenal 
concepts is immune against that strategy.32 Finally, I discussed and rebutted two 
objections to the effect that I may have saved luminosity but at the price of rendering it 
uninteresting in philosophical respects.33 
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1 Certainly, this sketch of the discussion is somewhat ahistorical. For example, Williamson 
(2000, 100) already anticipates the objection that there might be a constitutive connection 
between experiences and beliefs. However, as far as I know, it was Weatherson (2004) who first 
explicitly articulated this objection. Moreover, the refined safety condition in terms of degrees 
of confidence already appears in Williamson (2000). Srinivasan (2015) vindicates the refined 
safety condition against criticism by Leitgeb (2002), Berker (2008), Ramachandran (2009), and 
Cohen (2010). 
2 For arguments along these lines, see Brueckner and Fiocco (2002), Neta and Rohrbaugh 
(2004), Comesaña (2005), and Conee (2005). 
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3 Cf. Wong (2008), Vogel (2010). 
4 Although she does not explicitly reshape Williamson’s argument along these lines, my 
reformulation owes much to Srinivasan (2015); see especially p. 302 and pp. 306–8.  
5 I adopt this formulation from Smithies (2012, 264), where a “schematic version of the 
accessibility thesis” is formulated. Note, however, that unlike my formulation, Smithies’ 
accessibility thesis has the form of a biconditional that combines a self-intimation claim and an 
infallibility claim. 
6 Certainly, this is not to say that in αi+1, Mr. Davis feels hot. Note that not feeling cold is 
compatible with neither feeling cold nor feeling hot. Nonetheless, the assumption that there is a 
clearly defined boundary between cases in which Mr. Davis feels cold and cases in which he no 
longer feels cold is controversial. As both Stefan Reining and one of the journal reviewers have 
pointed out to me, proponents of ontic and semantic vagueness might claim that in αi+1, it is 
indeterminate whether Mr. Davis feels cold. Accordingly, it would not be true to say that Mr. 
Davis no longer feels cold in αi+1—for Mr. Davis still feels cold in αi+1, but indeterminately so. 
Therefore, the appeal to vagueness seems to be a promising strategy to refute Williamson’s 
argument at the very outset. However, I do not wish to pursue this line of thought any further, 
because in this paper, I am interested in another objection to Williamson’s argument, an 
objection that does without any appeal to vagueness. Thus, for the sake of argument, I will 
accept the assumption that there is a clearly defined boundary between cases in which Mr. 
Davis feels cold and cases in which he no longer feels cold. 
7 Cf. Srinivasan (2015, 302). 
8  Cf. Weatherson (2004, 379); Berker (2008, 9); Ramachandran (2009, 665). See also 
Srinivasan (2015, 308). 
9 Cf. Chalmers (2003), particularly sections 3.1, 3.2, and 4.1. Similar ideas about phenomenal 
concepts can be found in Gertler (2001, 2012) and Horgan & Kriegel (2007). 
10 This analogy was originally used by Lehrer (1997), 167–170, and Papineau (2002), 116–121. 
Although Chalmers (2003) does not use the analogy of quotation, some of his remarks draw a 
picture of direct phenomenal concepts that almost resemble the quotational account. On p. 243, 
for example, he suggests “that the basis for a direct phenomenal concept contains within it a 
‘slot’ for an instantiated quality, such that the quality that fills the slot constitutes the content.” 
It is natural to think of this slot as the space between mental quotes. 
11 Balog (2012, 35). 
12 One may have reservations about the very idea of direct phenomenal concepts. It may seem 
puzzling, for example, that a direct phenomenal concept has a very short lifespan: it only exists 
as long as the experience from which it is built exists. Thus, in contrast to garden-variety 
Penultimate draft. Please cite published version: DOI: 10.1111/papq.12198  
 
 
 26 
                                                                                                                                          
concepts such as “triangular,” a direct phenomenal concept cannot be used repeatedly. Rather, it 
can be used only once. Because of this, one may think that direct phenomenal concepts are not 
concepts at all. I acknowledge these concerns. However, due to space constraints, I cannot 
provide a full-blown vindication of direct phenomenal concepts here, but refer the reader to 
Chalmers (2003) and Gertler (2001, 2012). If one continues to be skeptical about the very idea 
of direct phenomenal concepts after reading these papers, one may take my line of argument in 
a conditional sense: If direct phenomenal concepts exist, then there are beliefs about one’s 
current phenomenal states that prove to be immune to Williamson’s anti-luminosity argument. 
13 Cf. Weatherson (2004) and Berker (2008), who arrive at a similar conclusion. However, there 
are some differences between their considerations and mine. As I have already noted, 
Weatherson, for example, makes the rather strong, and thus implausible, claim that the 
experience of feeling cold and the belief that one feels cold might be constituted by the same 
brain state. Berker, in turn, assumes that “If one has done everything one can to decide whether 
one feels cold, then one believes that one feels cold only if one feels cold” (Berker 2008, 9). In 
my view, Berker is not quite correct here, as one can certainly believe that one feels cold even 
though one does not feel cold. The reason is that one might well use what Chalmers (2003, 239) 
calls standing phenomenal concepts in the process of forming one’s belief. 
14 Cf. Williamson (2000, 97); Srinivasan (2015, 309). 
15 One of the journal reviewers has pointed out that the proponent of anti-luminosity might be 
able to avoid this result by spreading out the two relevant cases, that is, αi and αi+1, over 
different possible worlds. Imagine, for example, that there is a non-actual world that differs 
from the actual world only in that the timespan during which Mr. Davis’s thermal feelings 
change gradually from cold to warm is shifted only a millisecond back. In this world, call it “w,” 
there is a case in which Mr. Davis has the same thermal experience as he actually has at ti+1, 
namely, an “in-between” state of neither feeling cold nor feeling warm. Since the whole series 
of cases is shifted a millisecond back, however, this case does not occur at ti+1 in w, but at ti. 
Call this possible case “δi.” Now consider the proposition that would be expressed if Mr. Davis 
entertained the sentence “I currently undergo *↓*” in thought in αi and compare it with the 
proposition that would be expressed if Mr. Davis entertained the same sentence in thought in δi. 
Since the times are the same and nothing else has changed, it seems that these propositions are 
identical. It seems to follow, then, that there is an extremely similar possible situation, namely 
δi, in which Mr. Davis has an at-most-slightly-lower degree of confidence in the proposition he 
considers true in αi, though that proposition is false in δi—for in δi, Mr. Davis no longer feels 
cold. Hence, the belief that Mr. Davis holds in αi is not safe. However, this argument does not 
succeed in the end for reasons that I provide immediately. To anticipate: in δi, Mr. Davis is not 
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able to grasp the proposition he considers true in αi; therefore, he cannot have any degree of 
confidence in it at all. 
16 Cf. Williamson (2000, 102). 
17 One might object that the “cold“ thermal experience Mr. Davis underwent at ti no longer 
exists at ti+1, such that Mr. Davis cannot demonstratively refer to it at ti+1. However, I think that 
it is quite easy to demonstratively refer to events in the past through one’s memory. Thus, I see 
no fundamental problem in the idea of demonstratively referring to immediately bygone 
experiences. 
18 I owe this objection to one of the journal reviewers. 
19 Cf. Chalmers (2003). 
20 Cf. Chalmers (2003, 233). 
21 I am assuming here that propositions have an inner structure that exactly mirrors the 
conceptual structure of the sentences used to express them. I agree with the observation of one 
of the journal reviewers that this assumption is not uncontroversial. However, I think that there 
are good arguments for assuming that propositions are structured in a way that mirrors the 
conceptual structure of sentences—particularly if one takes propositions to be the contents of 
beliefs. See, for example, Cresswell (1985). 
22 I owe this objection to the three journal reviewers. 
23 Strictly speaking, it is incorrect to frame the issue in terms of conditions tout court—for one 
and the same condition might be luminous under one guise and non-luminous under another. 
Thus, Williamson occasionally speaks of conditions presented under this or that guise (cf. 
Williamson 2000, 94 f.). However, for the sake of brevity, I follow Williamson in leaving the 
reference to guises tacit. 
24 Cf. Williamson (1996, 573) who describes the view he criticizes as follows: “[T]hought 
initially engages with conditions whose esse is their percipi; if it later finds its laborious way to 
conditions of greater depth, it must do so from the starting point of that cognitive home.” 
25 One of the journal reviewers appropriately rephrased this objection as “we’ve saved the 
foundations but lost the world.” 
26 Cf. Wittgenstein (1953, §279). 
27 I admit that it is not at all easy to positively state what exactly the epistemic value of beliefs 
such as “I currently undergo *↓*” is; in particular, exactly what inferences they license us to 
draw or what other beliefs they can be used to evidentially support. The least that can be said, I 
think, is that the beliefs in question serve as a kind of interface between the realm of the 
phenomenal and the realm of the conceptual: they somehow lift phenomenal items onto the 
Penultimate draft. Please cite published version: DOI: 10.1111/papq.12198  
 
 
 28 
                                                                                                                                          
conceptual level and thereby ensure that our conception of the world is constrained by our 
experiences. 
28 Cf. Williamson (1996, 557; 2000, 107–109). 
29 An alternative way of phrasing this is that the sentence “I am here now” as it is entertained in 
thought by Lingens in the Main Library at Stanford on July 4, 1970 afternoon is contingent 
according to its secondary proposition, but necessary according to its primary proposition. See 
Chalmers (1996, 63f.). 
30 I owe this objection to another one of the journal reviewers, different from the one who raised 
the previous objection. 
31 Again, an alternative way to phrase this is that the sentence “I currently undergo *↓*” as it is 
entertained in thought by Mr. Davis in αi is contingent according to both its secondary and 
primary propositions. 
32 One of the journal reviewers has noted that my overall argument in this paper has some 
resemblance to Keith Hossack’s (2002; 2007) reaction to Williamson. However, as far as I can 
see, the differences prevail. For example, Hossack defends what he calls the “Identity Thesis,” 
according to which “any conscious state is identical with knowledge of its own occurrence” 
(Hossack 2002, 174). The Identity Thesis, in turn, conceptually entails that being in a conscious 
state is a luminous condition in Williamson’s sense. In contrast, I am not committed to a thesis 
as strong as Hossack’s Identity Thesis. I do not argue for the claim that, say, S has a feeling of 
cold iff S has knowledge of that feeling. Rather, I argue for the claim that having a feeling of 
cold is sufficient for being in a position to know (or, more cautiously, to safely believe) that one 
undergoes a feeling of cold, provided that one picks out this feeling by a direct phenomenal 
concept. This is quite compatible with someone having a feeling of cold but lacking knowledge 
of that feeling. 
33 The main part of this paper was written during my time as a research associate at the 
University of Duisburg-Essen under the auspices of Thomas Spitzley. I am greatly indebted to 
him for giving me free rein during this period. He also gave me the opportunity to present a 
previous draft to his graduate seminar in November 2015. I thank all the participants, 
particularly Lars Dänzer, Katharina Lührmann, and Stefan Reining, for helpful comments. 
Finally, I thank the three anonymous reviewers of this journal for their extremely valuable 
suggestions, comments, and time. Work on this paper was supported by research grant BA 
2269/2–1 and BA 2269/2–2 from the German Research Foundation (DFG). 
 
